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Abstract
The paper studies a world where a region provides essential inputs for the successful im-
plementation of a local public policy project with spill-overs, and where bargaining between
di®erent levels of government may ensure e±cient decision making ex post. We ask whether
the authority over the public policy measure should rest with the local government or be cen-
tralized, allowing ¯nancial relationships within the federation to be designed optimally. We
show that centralization is always dominant when governments are benevolent, and that both
governance structures are otherwise ine±cient as long as political bargaining is disregarded.
With bargaining, however, the ¯rst best can often be achieved under decentralization, but not
under centralization. At the root of the result is the alignment of decision making over both
essential inputs and ¯nal project size under decentralization.
JEL Classi¯cation: D23, D78, H21, H 77
Keywords: Federalism, Constitutions, Decentralization, Grants, Political Bargaining.
¤Preliminary versions were presented at the 2004 Queen's University Public Economics Workshop, the 2004
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at the 2006 CIAR Fall meeting. We thank Robin Boadway, Avner Greif, Kai Konrad, Ben Lockwood, Hao Li,
Thorsten Persson, Michael Smart, David Wildasin, and seminar participants for helpful comments. We also thank
SSHRC and CIAR for their ¯nancial support. All errors are ours.1 Introduction
On December 1, 2004 the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (TransLink) gave its ap-
proval to the Canada Line Rapid Transit Project, a rail-based rapid transit line linking the Van-
couver Airport to downtown Vancouver. With its $ 1.9 billion ($ 2003) capital cost, the transit
line is one of the largest single public projects in the greater Vancouver area to date. Notably,
although the local agency Translink alone was put in charge of the Canada line, there had been
prolonged negotiations involving agreements securing substantial funding contributions from both
the federal and the provincial governments prior to the time of ¯nal approval.1 Moreover, even
before approval, Translink had already spent almost $ 30 million on the project, primarily on the
administration of the procurement process, property acquisition, community liaison, and public
consultations.
While the last two features are noteworthy, we believe they are far from unique in public policy
formation, irrespective of whether it is decentralized and lies with local or regional authority (as
in the above example), or centralized and lies with the federal authority.2 First, all a®ected levels
of government participate in the process through talks and negotiations prior to the ¯nal decision,
which often involves ¯nancial contributions through cost-sharing (matching) grants or other inter-
governmental transfer mechanisms. The way in which this cost-sharing arises is partly codi¯ed
in the federal constitution, and it is logically distinct from the question of who has authority to
implement a certain project. As already noted by Coase, rational parties are not likely to forego
potential Pareto improvements provided negotiations are feasible and compensatory payments can
be made. In the Canada Line example, both the federal and the provincial governments stepped
in to ensure that the project { with its positive externalities on the province and on Canada as a
1To oversee procurement, design, construction, and implementation of the entire project from start to ¯nish,
TransLink created Canada Line Rapid Transit Inc. (CLCO, formerly RAVCO) as a special-purpose subsidiary.
Apart from Translink itself, there are three other public funding sources: the federal government of Canada ($ 421
million), the provincial government of British Columbia ($ 387 million), and the Vancouver International Airport
Authority ($ 251 million). Data Source: RAVCO Annual Report 2004 and Quartely Report # 1, January { March
2005.
2A case in point is the twinning of the Port-Mann Bridge over the Fraser River, which is another large scale
transportation project in the Vancouver area but in contrast to the Canada Line constitutes a provincial pol-
icy decision. The estimated cost are at CDN $ 1.4 Billion, which is ¯nanced by user tolls, plus provincial and
federal funds. The project has not been approved, but negotiations are under way. Notwithstanding strong provin-
cial support, the city of Vancouver has been continuously trying to block the bridge expansion. Both the city
council (June 2006) and the Vancouver Transportation Board (September 2006) voted against the project and
expressed their \strong opposition" unless the province \adequately compensates for additional cost of upgrading
local infrastructure" and for \impact on agricultural lands, regional parks, and ecologically sensitive areas". See
http://www.gatewayprogram.bc.ca/http://www.gatewayprogram.bc.ca/ for details.
1whole { went ahead.3
Second, local involvement in the public project production process is substantial. While some part
of production (e.g. project size and design) may be at one level of government, other parts of the
process (e.g. cost reducing investments or product distribution issues) can be at another level.
Even if the local public project is under central authority, however, it is essential for a successful
implementation that it has the support of the local authority: there are local citizens to convince,
local laws to modify, local red tape to overcome; and local infrastructure to make compatible with
the project size and design. In the case of the Canada Line, Translink had to acquire property,
apply for municipal permits, relocate utilities, consult the public and design a community liaison
plan for the construction phase before the project gained approval. And it will have to continue
with these kinds of investments even though the scale of the project is not ¯nalized. The agreement
allows for adjustments to the original plan, which quite likely will undergo various changes over
the next years that will be very much open to bargaining and politics.
The present paper studies the consequences and determinants of assigning authority over public
projects to di®erent levels of government. Our basic framework is very simple. There is a federation
consisting of two regions. In the `project' region a local public project of variable size and uncertain
net value is being considered. The project causes spill-overs to a second `composite' region that
comprises a majority of the federation's inhabitants. To this basic model we add three elements
that we view as critical to the question of centralized versus decentralized provision, and that are
in line with the example above. First, following the more recent literature on ¯scal federalism (see
below for a review), we adopt a political economy view of government: the federal government
does not pursue the overall public welfare, but is composed of delegates from the regions whose
objective re°ects the interests of their constituency. In a decentralized regime, the project region
has the authority to determine the project size while in a centralized regime it lies with the federal
government (the composite region under majority rule). Second, we account for the essential role
of regional involvement in production by assuming that the project region can make preparatory
investments into the project. Importantly, the return of these investments, which accrues in the
form of reduced project cost or increased gross project value, is realized independently of whether
3Since almost half of the population in British Columbia live in and around Vancouver, the bene¯ts to the provin-
cial government are obvious. The federal government's interest in the Canada Line can possibly be attributed to the
fact that it is part of the city's preparations for hosting the 2010 Olympics. That the local authority would approve
the project was not certain until the ¯nal vote in the Translink Board of Directors, a body composed of mayors and
o±cials of all cities that are part of the Greater Vancouver Area. Indeed, there had been several rounds of voting,
each of which was followed by a federal or provincial pledge for new funding. For a complete history of the project,
see http://www.richmond.ca/discover/services/rav.htmhttp://www.richmond.ca/discover/services/rav.htm.
2the ¯nal decision is taken on the local or on the federal level. Moreover, their intangible nature
prevents them from being veri¯able by third parties, so that local investment levels cannot be di-
rectly enforced in any agreement. Third, we explicitly model the possibility of negotiations between
jurisdictions. The existing literature to the best of our knowledge disregards such negotiations on
a local level in a federation, that is, it interprets a decentralized system as one where no communi-
cation and cooperation takes place.4 Of course, in order to successfully reach a mutually bene¯cial
agreement, compensatory transfers are often called for. This leads us to illuminate the role of grant
systems in the determination of the optimal governance of federal systems, and to endogenize the
constitutional provisions which are taken in that respect. Thus, we allow regional representatives
to enter into cost-sharing arrangements, both ex ante at a time where the authority of the project
is assigned and ex post, after uncertainty is resolved, when additional negotiations are needed to
ensure an e±cient decision.
We organize our model and results to highlight the importance of these three elements. Our main
results are as follows. As a benchmark, we ¯rst show that a centralized system works e±ciently if
the central government is benevolent, and if an appropriate grant design is chosen ex ante. While
the central planner always implements the ex-post e±cient policy level, e±cient investments call for
a combination of cost grants and output grants. In the remainder, we adopt the more realistic view
that central decisions are political rather than benevolent. If political bargaining about ¯nal policies
is infeasible, we show that an e±cient outcome is impossible in a centralized and a decentralized
regime. Since grants serve the dual role of implementing optimal investments and optimal project
decisions, an e±ciency loss cannot be avoided: while an externality-internalizing grant system can
ensure e±cient project decisions in either regime, the project region never captures the full bene¯t
of its value-increasing investments. The latter are therefore too small in equilibrium. Overall,
there is no clear cut ranking of central authority versus decentralized authority.
Finally, we analyze the full model by allowing for ex post political bargaining on the ¯nal project
decision. Bargaining ensures that the decision is made e±ciently in either regime, irrespective of
the constitutional grant system. It does not imply, however, that investments are also e±cient.
4An exception is Harstad (2006) which is discussed below. While it is certainly true that transaction cost of
various sorts may prevent e±cient bargaining and a corresponding Pareto optimal policy outcome in reality, a
frictionless world provides a benchmark against which alternative views of political negotiations can be judged.
Existing models, in contrast, essentially assume that bargaining cost are prohibitive under decentralization while
they are completely absent under centralization. A priori, however, it is unclear why frictions are necessarily
less severe under the latter regime than under the former regime. In the end, it may not matter much whether
regional delegates come together in a federal assembly to bargain for a `centralized' political outcome, or whether
as representatives of autonomous, decentralized regions they meet to negotiate political issues of mutual concern.
3The reason is that regions also care (positively) about their disagreement payo®. In particular,
the equilibrium investment level of the project region is higher, the larger the project size that
would be chosen (optimally) if negotiations fail by whichever region has the authority. Under
decentralization, it is the project region itself which has this authority. In this case, there is a
grant system that often achieves e±ciency under decentralization, generically so if spillovers are
not too pronounced. Intuitively, large matching grants generate large project choices in the absence
of an agreement, which unambiguously increases investment incentives.
A similar reasoning does not apply to the centralization regime, however. Speci¯cally, we show
that achieving optimal value-increasing investments is generally impossible under centralized gov-
ernance, even under the optimal grant design. Hence, the institutional design matters and de-
centralization is shown to generally dominate centralization if ex post bargaining is allowed for.
This dichotomy follows from a fundamental misalignment between investment returns and default
project choice under centralization. Under centralization, it is not the project region but the ma-
jority region who chooses the default policy in the absence of an agreement. To induce this region
to choose a large default project, which would be necessary for a strong direct incentive e®ect
on investment, grants must be small, implying that the project region would bear much of the
project cost. The project region thus has an incentive to decrease the (default) project size, and
it can do so by reducing its investments. This negative indirect e®ect cannot be addressed with
lowering the project region's cost share because then, the default project size chosen by the ma-
jority region (which bears a large part of the cost in this case) and thus the direct e®ect are small.
Hence, regardless of the grant design, direct and indirect investment incentives always work in op-
posite directions, and an e±cient outcome remains elusive under centralization. Decentralization
dominates because it brings the investing region `on side' for the success of the local project.
2 Literature Review
To which level of government should policy functions be assigned? This question has long not only
been at the forefront of the political debate, but it has received signi¯cant scholarly attention.
The classical theory of federalism (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972) argues that regional governments
cater better to the needs of their constituency than a central government because of the latter's
tendency towards a uniform provision of public services across the federation. Conversely, the
advantage of centralization lies in the internalization of all federation{wide spillover e®ects of local
4public decisions. The optimal allocation of government authority then balances these con°icting
characteristics.While the traditional theory o®ers a conceptual framework and important guidelines
for an understanding of hierarchical government, it rests on two strong assumptions: ¯rst, that the
central government acts as a benevolent planner who pursues the common good and, second, that
its policies must be uniform across all jurisdictions.
These problems are addressed in the more recent literature on federalism, which adopts a political-
economy view of central government and questions uniformity of provision as a de¯ning feature
(and a disadvantage) of centralized public goods supply.5 In Besley and Coate (2003), the level
of impure public goods under centralization is determined either by a minimum-willing coalition
of regions, or by cooperative bargaining among the delegates from all regions. In the former
scenario, public goods supply is ine±cient for similar reasons as under decentralization: the ruling
coalition ignores the wellbeing of minority districts. In the latter scenario, bargaining ensures that
decisions are e±cient, but the population from each region now has a strategic incentive to elect a
representative with larger than median preferences for their local public good. As a consequence,
centralization can be suboptimal even when polities are relatively homogeneous and the elected
policy makers achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome ex post. In Lockwood (2002), regions can propose
policy projects in a federal assembly. The projects to be realized are then selected in a sequential
voting process. This paper ¯nds that the equilibrium outcome depends on the degree (and the
sign) of spill-overs which a regional project has on the majority of other regions. At the same time,
however, the ¯nal allocation will be completely independent of the bene¯ts to the home region in
which it can be carried out.6
In contrast to the existing literature, where cost-sharing rules are exogenous, we allow them to
be designed optimally.7 This puts us in a position to address the basic question whether di®erent
5See also the discussion in Oates (2005), who provides an excellent survey of the recent literature on federalism.
For an early contribution which drops the assumption of a benevolent planner, see Ellingsen (1998). In his model, a
pure public good is provided either in a decentralized fashion, or by a majority region that pursues its own interests
under exogenous cost sharing rules.
6Several papers in the recent literature analyze federal systems with a hybrid organizational structure. The
central government composed of individual regions directs public policies via majority vote. In addition, regions are
allowed to top up these provisions (which can be interpreted as federal mandates) by individual choice. See Cremer
and Palfrey (2000), Fernandez and Rogerson (2003), Alesina et al. (2005), and Hafer and Landa (2005). A general
¯nding emerging from these papers is that a majority of regions prefers such a dual system over a pure centralized
or a pure decentralized regime. See also Rubinchik-Pessach (2005) for a similar approach.
7In most settings analyzed in the literature, moving from a decentralized to a centralized regime changes the
¯nancing rules of public projects. The usual assumption is that cost sharing is only feasible under centralization.
This cost-pooling in the latter regime means that externalities are internalized at least to some degree, irrespective of
whether project expenditures are chosen by a median voter, in a sequential political process, or by some appointed
decision-maker. However, centralization does not completely solve the externality problem so that the eventual
policy outcome will in general be ine±cient.
5institutional regimes continue to yield di®erent economic outcomes when corrective grants and
subsidies become choice parameters. Moreover, and more importantly, decentralization in these
contributions is necessarily characterized by the total lack of cooperation with other regions in the
federation, i.e., any political negotiations among regions in a decentralized system is ruled out. To
our knowledge, the only other paper that explicitly studies political bargaining in decentralized
settings is by Harstad (2006) and quite di®erent in focus. The author considers a model where
regions do not provide public inputs (investments) but have private information on their valuation
of the project. The main result is that a mutual commitment to policy harmonization (uniform
policies) may be advantageous in inter-regional negotiations because is reduces delay in bargaining.
By emphasizing the role of speci¯c investments prior to the completion of the project, and in stress-
ing the relevance of (re-)negotiations, our paper is also closely related to the literature on property
rights and incomplete contracting [Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)]. There are
two main di®erences. First, since we allow for monetary cost-sharing and output grants, the initial
arrangement goes beyond a speci¯cation of institutional authority rights. By incorporating these
elements which are prevalent in reality, we study contracting opportunities that are less incomplete
than usually assumed in the literature. Second, the standard property-rights model posits that
parties without property rights who in the absence of an agreement are excluded from the use
of an asset realize a zero disagreement payo®. Conversely, in our federalism setting, externalities
naturally arise even when negotiations are unsuccessful and when as a consequence, the region
with authority rights chooses a project design that she ¯nds privately optimal. This public-goods
character of the joint project is also the focus of Besley and Ghatak (2001). The most important
¯nding of their paper is that in sharp contrast to the main message from property-rights theory,
the agent with the larger absolute bene¯t from the project should be assigned authority rights
when the project realization causes externalities.8
8While our basic setup is quite similar, framework and results of both papers di®er signi¯cantly. Besley and
Ghatak con¯ne attention to a binary project choice, and in addition assume that both `agents' privately bene¯t from
the realization of the project regardless of investments. Accordingly, in their model the authority structure does not
a®ect the default project size which in our setting, would make centralization and decentralization indistinguishable.
Furthermore, in contrast to the present paper, the marginal investment e®ect on default payo®s depends on the
authority structure; in particular, the respective marginal return is larger for the agent in control. The combination
of this assumption with the feature of regime-independent default projects then yields the main result: the agent
with higher stakes should have authority, no matter how important her relative investments are. Note also that in
line with standard property-rights theory but in contrast to the present paper, Besley and Ghatak do not consider
monetary (grant) schemes.
63 The Model
We consider a federal system that is comprised of two jurisdictions, j = A;B. Region A can pursue
a public project x of variable size which may cause an externality on the other, composite, region B.
The model has three stages: at a constitutional prestage (stage 0), the regions select an authority
structure (centralization, decentralization) with regard to the implementantion of the policy x, and
in addition agree on a grant system that is detailed below. In a next stage (stage 1), region A then
undertakes two types of public investments. The ¯rst investment (which we label a) increases the
expected bene¯t of the policy measure x that is pursued subsequently. For instance, if the project
is a new airport that bene¯ts both regions, its social value may be enhanced by investments in the
surrounding infrastructure (streets, public transportation), in noise abatement, or in improving the
planning procedure as an intangible asset. Secondly, the region may also undertake investments
e which decrease the expected costs of the policy project x: it may spend e®ort in ¯nding the
most cost-e±cient suppliers, or invest in research to ¯nd out the most cost-e±cient design. After
these investments are made, uncertainty on value and costs of the policy measure is resolved at
the beginning of stage 2. If the possibility of political bargaining among regions at this stage is left
aside, the political institution with authority now chooses x which is then implemented in stage 3.
Alternatively, the regions may be able to renegotiate the policy level. We label this latter scenario
as `federalism with politics', and will analyze it in Section 5 below.
Regions are governed by local governments, who by assumption act in the best interest of their
respective constituencies.9 Also, we will impose two distinct behavioral assumptions on the central
government. We ¯rst assume a benevolent planner who maximizes global welfare as is presumed
in Oates' (1972) pioneering work. Subsequently, and more realistically, we then model the central
government as a federal assembly that is composed of delegates from both jurisdictions, who pursue
the interests of their home regions.
Let x 2 [0; ¹ x] be the size or scope of the policy project, e.g., the quantity or quality of public
goods provided, the capacity of an airport, or the rigidity of environmental standards. We denote
the value-enhancing investments of region A by a 2 R
+
0 . Likewise, cost-reducing investments are
indicated as e 2 R
+
0 . The corresponding investment outlays are Á(a) and Ã(e), respectively. In
9This behavioral postulate serves to simplify the analysis. Of course, this assumption is very natural if individuals
in a region have identical preferences. With heterogenous voters, regional representatives may be elected in an
intraregional voting process. Voters will elect a politician who represents, e.g., the preferences of the regional
median voter. Analyzing intraregional heterogenity would be straightforward in the present context and is therefore
left out in our analysis.
7stage 2, after investments have been made and uncertainty has been resolved, a project of size x
generates a total gross bene¯t measured in monetary terms by V (x;a;µ) across the federation. At
the same time, it causes total implementation or opportunity costs C(x;e;µ). The variable µ is
a random shock and distributed according to a continuous cumulative distribution function F(µ)
on the support [µ; ¹ µ]. Bene¯ts and costs of the `status quo' policy x = 0 are normalized to zero.
Throughout the paper, we also impose
Assumption. All functions V (¢);C(¢); Á(¢) and Ã(¢) are non-negative. Moreover, V (¢);Á(¢) and
Ã(¢) are increasing in their arguments, whereas C(¢) is increasing in x and µ and decreasing in e.
For any a;e;µ, all functions satisfy (subscripts denote derivatives)
a) limx!¹ x V (x;a;µ) ¡ C(x;e;µ) < 0 and V (x;a;µ) ¡ C(x;e;µ) > 0 for some µ < ¹ µ and some
x > 0. Also, Vxx · 0, Cxx > 0.
b) Vax > 0 and limx!¹ x Va(x;a;µ) ! 1; Cxe < 0 and limx!¹ x ¡Ce(x;e;µ) ! 1.
c) Vaa(¢) · 0, Áaa(¢) > 0, Á(0) = lima!0 Áa(a) = 0 and lima!1 Áa(a) = 1.
d) Cee ¸ 0, Ãee(¢) > 0, Ã(0) = lime!0 Ãe(e) = 0 and lime!1 Ãe(e) = 1.
According to a), the socially e±cient project size is unique, strictly positive in some states µ and
always less than the maximal size ¹ x, irrespective of investments. Part b) states that the return
on cost-decreasing and value-enhancing investments increases in the project size. Speci¯cally, the
marginal return on investment increases without bounds.10 The convexity and Inada conditions
in c) and d) ensure the optimality of some positive but ¯nite investment levels.
For simplicity, we model the regional shares of total bene¯ts from the project parametrically.
Region A reaps a gross return of V A = ¯V (¢) while the return of the composite region B is
V B = (1 ¡ ¯)V (¢). Thus, the parameter ¯ 2 [0;1] measures the relative spillovers of the policy
pursued in the project region A on region B.11
We are especially concerned with the interplay between the governance structure and grant assign-
ments both of which are chosen in what is called the constitutional prestage, stage 0.12 Throughout
10This last assumption is dispensable but signi¯cantly eases the analysis in Section 5 below.
11For example, suppose x is a pure public good and all individuals in the economy have identical valuations.
Then, V (¢) is the sum of individual utilities in the overall economy, and ¯ represents the fraction of individuals
living in A while (1¡¯) indicates the fraction of individuals who live in B. The case where there are no externalities
corresponds to ¯ = 1. The case of negative externalities, (1¡¯) < 0 can (with appropriate adjustments) be analyzed
analogously and is therefore disregarded in our formal analysis.
12Of course, the actual level of grant promises is not always ¯xed in a constitution, but on a case-by-case basis
after a potential project has been identi¯ed. This alternative interpretation is fully compatible with our model.
8the paper, we suppose that grant payments can be contingent on the project level x and on its
respective costs, C(x;¢). On the other hand, the investments (a;e) as well as the state µ and
the project gross value V (¢) are assumed to be non-contractible. Investments may be intangible
assets which are hard to verify, or they may represent a bundle of measures so complex that it is
impossible to really describe them contractually. Likewise, the gross value of the policy is a bene¯t
which is idiosyncratic to either region, and thus cannot be observed by an enforcing party (such
as a Federal Supreme Court).
In order to make our discussion as transparent as possible, we assume that regional preferences
are described by quasi-linear utility functions. Monetary side payments thus enter additively,
and utilities are fully transferable. Then, governance structure and grant system will at stage 0
be chosen so as to achieve a Pareto-optimal (i.e., welfare maximizing) outcome. In particular,
distributional issues can be accounted for by initial lump-sum transfers across regions.13 We also
allow regions to have access to the following grants which are prominent and wide spread in reality.
(i) Cost-matching grants. These grants are described by a parameter ® that re°ects the fraction
of implementation costs C(¢) to be borne by region B. If some x is implemented, region A
thus receives a grant of size ®C(x;¢) which is disbursed by the other region.14
(ii) Output grants. Region A may be eligible for grant payments that are contingent on the
project size x. Indicating t as a payment per unit x, A receives an output grant of size tx
when a policy x is implemented.
In summary, we consider the following stage game which is played under perfect information.
Stage 0: Political representatives from each region decide on the governance structure and on a
grant system, comprised of output and cost-matching grants. (In addition, there may be a non-
contingent lump-sum payment made from one region to the other.)
Stage 1: Region A can undertake cost-reducing investments e and and value-enhancing investments
a into a policy measure, x.
13Clearly, the size and direction of these transfers depend on the governance structure in force prior to the stage 0,
and on the ex-ante bargaining strength of either region, respectively. We can be agnostic about these issues because
they do not a®ect our analysis.
14Alternatively, grants may be paid by the central government and re¯nanced via general taxation that is imposed
on either region. While the actual grant parameter may di®er from ® if region A bears a part of the federal revenues,
® in our model is then a measure for the e®ective payments °owing to region A net of ¯nancing costs.
9Stage 2: Uncertainty is resolved. Representatives from A and the composite region B may ne-
gotiate the policy measure x to be implemented. Default payo®s depend on whether region A
(decentralization), or region B (centralization) has authority over implementing the project.
Stage 3: Policy x is implemented, grant payments are made, and the game ends.
As a benchmark for future comparison, it is useful to compute the socially optimal policy level
x¤(¢) to be chosen at stage 3. At that date, region A has already expended (a;e) and µ has been
revealed. Accordingly, the e±cient project size solves
x¤(a;e;µ) = arg max
x2[0;¹ x]
S(x;a;e;µ) ´ V (x;a;µ) ¡ C(x;e;µ): (1)
Under our previous assumptions, x¤(a;e;µ) > 0 for a nonempty set of realizations µ, which is then
uniquely determined by the ¯rst-order condition
Vx(x¤;a;µ) = Cx(x¤;e;µ): (2)
De¯ne S¤ ´ S(x¤(a;e;µ);a;e;µ) as the maximum surplus in stage 2 and note that S¤ is independent
of ¯ and strictly increasing in (a;e) if x¤(¢) > 0. In stage 1, the socially optimal investment outlays
(a¤;e¤) to be undertaken by region A maximize the ex-ante expected overall surplus in the economy,
i.e.,
(a¤;e¤) 2 arg max
a;e¸0
Eµ [S(x¤(¢);a;e;µ)] ¡ Á(a) ¡ Ã(e): (FB)
Again, our assumptions ensure that (a¤;e¤) satis¯es the corresponding ¯rst-order conditions which,
using the envelope theorem, read
Eµ Va(x¤(¢);e¤;µ) = Áa(a¤) and ¡ Eµ Ce(x¤(¢);e¤;µ) = Ãe(e¤) (3)
As we would expect, the marginal expected returns from investments (evaluated at the conditionally
optimal policy level) should be equal to marginal investments costs at the optimum.
In what follows, we indicate the ¯rst-best project size in a state µ as xFB(¢) = x¤(a¤;e¤;µ). Also,
let a¤(e) (and e¤(a), respectively) be the conditionally optimal level of a for any given e (and
the conditionally optimal level of e for any given a, respectively). We are now prepared for an
equilibrium analysis under di®erent assumptions on government behavior.
104 Benevolent Central Planner
To start with, consider a centralized governance structure in which a benevolent government P has
authority over the policy measure x. Denoting as Sj(¢) the gross surplus of region j and recalling
that distributional issues are irrelevant in our setting, this planner chooses x in stage 3 so as to
maximize
S(¢) = SA(¢) + SB(¢) = V (x;a;µ) ¡ C(x;e;µ): (4)
Clearly, the resulting policy level x¤(e;a;µ) is e±cient for any (a;e) and in any state of the world
µ. We can now investigate the investment decisions of region A in stage 1. For any constitutional
grant assignment (t;®), the region chooses a and e to maximize the net surplus of its inhabitants
(P stands for Benevolent Planner),
UA
P (¢) = Eµ f¯V (x¤;a;µ) + tx¤ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)C(x¤;e;µ)g ¡ Á(a) ¡ Ã(e): (5)
Maximization of this program yields the following ¯rst-order conditions for the region's equilibrium
investments:
Eµ f¯Va(x¤;a;µ) + [¯Vx(x¤;¢) + t ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Cx(x¤)]
dx¤
da
g = Áa(a); (6)
Eµ f¡(1 ¡ ®)Ce(x¤;e;µ) + [¯Vx(x¤;¢) + t ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Cx(x¤)]
dx¤
de
g = Ãe(e): (7)
The ¯rst terms in (6) and in (7), respectively, represent the (positive) marginal direct e®ect of
investments on A's payo®. The second term in both conditions indicates an indirect e®ect which
arises because region A has preferences over but cannot directly choose the project size: since
the central government's selection of x¤(a;e;µ) depends on region A's e®ort, the region indirectly
a®ects the central policy. Notice that the indirect e®ect is positive if and only if xA(¢) > x¤(¢), and
vice versa: If region A is eligible for large grant payments, it is interested in a larger policy than
P will provide, and higher investments are a tool to achieve this goal.
To further assess conditions (6) and (7), suppose ¯rst ® = t = 0, a situation where A receives
no monetary support from the other regions in the federation. Then, the indirect e®ect in either
condition is negative whenever ¯ < 1 because x¤(¢) is increasing in a and e, and Vx(x¤;¢) ¡
Cx(x¤(¢) = 0 by the de¯nition of x¤(¢). In absence of grant payments, the region aims to reduce
the policy level x through reduced investments because it bears the entire costs while receiving
only a fraction ¯ of the accompanied social bene¯ts.15 For this reason, the region unambiguously
15In addition, the direct e®ect in (6) is smaller than the social marginal return from value-increasing investments
for any ¯ < 1.
11underinvests not only in bene¯t enhancement but also in cost reduction when ® = t = 0.
We can now ask whether cost or quantity grants can remedy this underinvestment problem. The
answer is positive, by the following arguments. Note that the indirect e®ect increases in t without
bounds because x¤(¢) remains una®ected. Hence, for any arbitrary ®, some t¤(®) renders the
indirect e®ect strictly positive and satis¯es (6) for a = a¤(e). Next, consider (7) for t = t¤(®).
Again, the indirect e®ect is positive which implies that A overinvests in cost-reducing activities for
® = 0. At the same time, increasing ® while ¯xing t = t¤(®) reduces e arbitrarily.16 As a result,
there must exist some combination (®¤;t¤(®¤)) which implements the ¯xed points a = a¤(e) and
e = e¤(a), and we have
Proposition 1. Consider centralization with a benevolent government. Then, some constitutional
policy (®¤ > 0;t¤ > 0) implements a ¯rst-best outcome. Moreover, under the optimal grant design,
region A would prefer a policy size larger than the one chosen in equilibrium.
Centralization is an e±cient governance structure if grant design is optimal and if the central gov-
ernment maximizes social welfare. We also obtain that in general, both cost and output grants are
necessary to sustain a ¯rst-best outcome. These ¯ndings have intuitive appeal. With a benevolent
central government, grants serve no role in achieving an ex-post e±cient policy outcome: given the
preferences of the federal decisionmaker, x¤ prevails regardless of constitutional grant provisions.
Rather, the purpose of grants is to ¯ne tune the project region's incentives to invest in cost reduc-
tion and bene¯t enhancement, which quite naturally requires a properly designed combination of
output and cost grants.
The Proposition also conveys a somewhat counterintuitive result, namely that optimal grants
are so substantial that region A prefers a larger project than the one actually implemented by
the central government. To see why, consider `small' grants for which region A would prefer a
project size less or equal to x¤(¢). Inspecting (6) and noting that the indirect e®ect is non-positive,
shows that with positive externalities ¯ > 0, the region will still underinvest in value increasing
measures as it reaps only a fraction of the associated bene¯ts. Remedying this non-internalization
problem requires larger grants: the region A would then prefer a project size in excess of x¤(¢),
which renders the indirect e®ect positive. In simple terms, large grants boost the project region's
investment incentives because a larger project size implies larger absolute grant payments.
16We cannot rule out some ® > 1 to be optimal here, in order to prevent an overshooting of A's cost-reducing
investments.
12Before closing this Section, notice that the opportunity to bargain over the ex-post chosen policy
level would not a®ect the benevolent-planner scenario: since P implements the Pareto e±cient
project level x¤(¢), there is no room for further bargaining in equilibrium. We should thus note
that the e±ciency properties of centralization with a benevolent government apply whether or
not political bargaining is feasible. From now on, the present paper will drop the assumption of
a benevolent central government. The next Section introduces a more realistic representation of
decisionmaking under centralized authority, which we will then use for comparing the outcomes
under centralization and decentralization, ¯rst in a setting where political ex-post bargaining is
assumed to be infeasible.
5 Federalism without Bargaining
The present Section addresses the investment and policy choices in a federal system where regions
do not negotiate with each other to determine the ¯nal policy outcome, but in which the central
outcome is chosen in a political process. In its decentralization variant, this setting can be seen as
a reassessment of the arguments in Oates (1972) for a scenario where regions can undertake non-
contractible investments prior to the implementation of policy projects. Speci¯cally, while Oates
showed that corrective grants implement an e±cient outcome under decentralization, we can ask
whether or not they have the same e®ect in the present setting. Subsection 5.1 considers decen-
tralization where region A has authority to choose and implement its preferred policy. Subsection
5.2 explores centralized decisionmaking in a stylized democratic process with majority rule. In
either case, we analyze the implications of an e±cient grant design at the constitutional prestage.
In addition, we take a closer look at the outcome which prevails in absence of grant promises made
to region A.
5.1 Decentralization
If the authority to decide on x lies with the project region A, the regional government chooses the
project size to maximize regional welfare.17
17While we disregard intra-regional heterogeneity for simplicity, we could easily incorporate it by assuming regional
decisions to be taken by majority voting under some given ¯nancing rule. Then, the median voter theorem applies
and regional policies are determined by the preferences of the individual with median preferences (see, e.g., Besley
and Coate, 2003; Alesina et al., 2001). Besley and Coate (1997) show that this result extends to mutidimensional
policy spaces in two candidate elections, which can arise endogenously in their model. As is well-known, such
democratic processes will not maximize regional welfare in an utilitarian sense if median preferences di®er from
mean preferences.
13Suppose a grant system (®;t) was agreed upon and put in place at stage 0. Then, region A will in
stage 3 implement a policy xA which maximizes its continuation utility
SA(x;a;e;µ;®;t) = ¯V (x;a;µ) + tx ¡ (1 ¡ ®)C(x;e;µ) (8)
in each state µ. The corresponding ¯rst-order condition for an interior solution xA > 0 reads
¯Vx(xA;a;µ) + t = (1 ¡ ®)Cx(x;e;µ): (9)
One can easily check that xA(¢) is strictly increasing in (a;e) and in t, and strictly decreasing in ®.
For the Pigouvian cost subsidy ® = 1¡¯ and t = 0, region A implements the ex-post e±cient policy
x¤(¢). Conversely, without any grant assignment, ® = t = 0, xA(¢) < x¤(¢) whenever spillovers
are present, ¯ < 1. Anticipating its subsequent implementation decision, region A chooses it
investments at stage 1 so as to maximize (D stands for Decentralization)
UA
D(¢) = Eµ f¯V (xA;a;µ) + txA ¡ (1 ¡ ®)C(xA;e;µ)g ¡ Á(a) ¡ Ã(e): (10)
Under our technical assumptions and using the envelope theorem, the equilibrium investments
(aD;eD) are then implicitly determined by the ¯rst-order conditions
Eµ ¯Va(xA;a;µ) = Áa(a) (11)
and
¡Eµ (1 ¡ ®)Ce(xA;e;µ) = Ãe(e): (12)
If region A receives no grants, it will choose a level of cost-reducing investments which is optimal for
the (suboptimally small) policy xA that is subsequently implemented. Conversely, value-increasing
investments will be too small even if set in relation to xA, because region A disregards the e®ect
of its investment on the other region for ¯ < 1. Only for ¯ = 1 where spillovers are absent, both
types of investments are chosen e±ciently and xA(¢) = x¤(¢), with the consequence of a ¯rst-best
outcome.
Consider now an optimal design of cost and output grants. We ¯nd that an ex-post e±cient
policy choice x¤(¢) is necessarily incompatible with the goal of achieving e±cient value-enhancing
investments a¤(e): the ¯rst-order condition (11) immediately reveals that for any given policy xA
which is implemented, investment incentives are smaller than e±cient for any ¯ < 1. This negative
¯nding, though, does not extend to cost-reducing investments. Here, ® = 0 and an output grant
that implements xA = x¤(¢) guarantees e±cient cost reduction e¤(a), as is easily seen from (12).
14Note also that under the second-best grant design, the regions will rationally never use a cost
subsidy ® > 0. Any cost-matching grant distorts A's incentives to invest in cost reduction, simply
because the region no longer bears the full project costs. On the other hand, a positive output
grant is desirable, inducing region A to choose a larger project size and to internalize the project
externality to some degree. These arguments yield
Proposition 2. Consider decentralization without ex-post bargaining. Then, an optimal federal
constitution will comprise output grants t¤ > 0 but no cost-matching grants, ®¤ = 0. Moreover,
(1) An e±cient outcome prevails if the region can undertake only cost-reducing investments. In
this case, the optimal grant is a Pigouvian output grant, t¤ > 0.18
(2) With spillovers (¯ < 1), an e±cient outcome is infeasible if the region can undertake value-
increasing investments, or both investments. Under the optimal grant, the region implements
a policy xA(¢) ¸ x¤(¢), it underinvests in value enhancement, and it invests optimally (given
xA) into cost reduction.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The outcome under decentralization is necessarily ine±cient whenever there is any role for value-
increasing investments. The reason for this de¯ciency is quite intuitive. While cost and output
grants can control for the project size that is selected by region A, they cannot tackle the externality
which arises because A does not appropriate the full social return of its value-increasing activities,
no matter what the policy level. This causes a trade-o® between larger investments if xA(¢)
is raised above x¤(¢), and the reduction in allocative e±ciency which comes along with it. We
already mentioned that this tradeo® does not arise for cost-reducing investments as long as the
constitution does not prescribe any cost subsidy, ® = 0. As an immediate consequence, the
equilibrium policy with optimal grants under decentralization is never smaller but possibly larger
than e±cient. While counterintuitive at ¯rst glance, an excessive project size emerges because a
bigger project boosts value-increasing e®ort while - at the margin - leaving the equilibrium level
of cost-reducing investments una®ected. Aggregate grant payments in the decentralization regime
should thus exceed those of a Pigouvian subsidy in order to ensure a second-best outcome.
Our results so far show that with a benevolent central government, centralized authority on project
implementation strictly dominates decentralization, even if corrective grants can be optimally
18Speci¯cally, t¤ = Eµ (1 ¡ ¯)Vx(x¤;¢)=x¤(¢).
15chosen.19 Another interesting issue worth addressing is whether the unambiguous ranking of
benevolent centralization in the tradition of Oates, and decentralization with a regional planner
continues to hold for non-optimal subsidy levels. Some answers are given in
Proposition 3. Without a grant policy, t = ® = 0, decentralization may dominate centralized
governance with a benevolent planner. Also, for a Pigouvian cost grant ® = 1 ¡ ¯ and t = 0,
both regimes yield identical outcomes where region A underinvests in cost-reducing as well as in
value-enhancing e®ort.
Proof: See the Appendix which presents an example where decentralization dominates for any
degree of spillovers, ¯ < 1, given (®;t) = 0. The second statement immediately follows from
inspection of the respective ¯rst-order conditions.
When grant are not optimally set, centralization is not necessarily more e±cient, even though
we allow for a benevolent central planner and do not impose policy uniformity across regions.
As Proposition 3 shows, decentralization may dominate, notwithstanding the fact that regional
government takes neither the external e®ects of its investment choice nor those of its policy selection
into account. Intuitively, with small or no grants, the project region has an interest to lower
the project level that is chosen by the benevolent planner under centralization. This can be
achieved by reducing investments, a motive which is absent in the decentralization regime where
region A is in control of the ¯nal policy choice. Investment e±ciency will thus be higher under
decentralization, and decentralization can be preferable overall even though the chosen project
size is ine±ciently small.20 The Proposition also says that interestingly, Pigouvian grants induce
identical outcomes across regimes. Since these grants align the desired output choice of central
and regional government, they also trigger identical investment responses.
Returning to optimal grants, the perhaps most striking di®erence between our and the traditional
analysis, though, is that even the optimal grant system does not resolve the underinvestment
problem under decentralization. This is because in contrast to centralization with benevolent gov-
ernment where grants leave the ¯nal policy choice una®ected, grants under decentralization serve
the dual purpose of ¯ne tuning investments, and a®ecting the project size. We ¯nd that output
or cost contingent transfers cannot be set up in a way that e±cient investments and an e±cient
19Note that our analysis is not completely compatible with the traditional setting, because the uniformity require-
ment under centralization ¯nds no equivalent in our setup with only one local public good.
20To see this, note that for positive but small grants (such that xA(¢) < x¤(¢)), investments under decentralization
are still higher because the indirect e®ect in (6) is still negative.
16allocative outcome prevail at the same time. The next subsection shows that a similar ine±ciency
exists under centralization when the central government is political rather than benevolent.
5.2 Centralization
In reality, central governments rarely act as benevolent entities. We now suppose that the central
government is a federal assembly, composed of representatives from both regions. These delegates
pursue their own idiosyncratic interests which, as said before, coincide across all individuals within
each region for simplicity. This setup encompasses parliamentary systems in which political deci-
sions are taken by some form of majority vote in a federal assembly (e.g., as in the UK, Germany
or Canada), as well as a Presidential systems in which some elected decisionmaker is assigned for
making these decisions (as, e.g., in the US or in France).
Decisions are taken via majority rule so that the region with more delegates in the assembly can
enforce its preferred policy. If region A is the majority region, the outcome clearly coincides with
the one under decentralization. To make the subsequent analysis meaningful, let us thus suppose
that delegates from the composite region B form the majority.21 If region B has authority in the
democratic process, it will in stage 3 choose a policy xB to maximize
SB(a;e;µ;®;t) = (1 ¡ ¯)V (x;a;µ) ¡ tx ¡ ®C(x;e;µ); (13)
and the corresponding ¯rst-order condition for interior solutions reads
(1 ¡ ¯)Vx(xB;a;µ) ¡ t = ®Cx(xB;e;µ): (14)
In contrast to the decentralization regime, xB(¢) now strictly decreases in t and ® because region
B dislikes grant payments. As under decentralization, for ® = 1 ¡ ¯ and t = 0, the implemented
policy is ex-post e±cient. Anticipating xB, region A then chooses it investments at stage 1 so as
to maximize (C stands for Centralization)
UA
C(¢) = Eµ f¯V (xB;a;µ) + txB ¡ (1 ¡ ®)C(xB;e;µ)g ¡ Á(a) ¡ Ã(e): (15)
Accordingly, the equilibrium investments (aC;eC) are implicitly determined by the ¯rst-order con-
ditions
Eµ ¯Va(xB;a;µ) + [¯Vx(a;xB;µ) + t ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Cx(xB;e;µ)]
dxB
da
= Áa(a); (16)
21Alternatively, we could assume that all federal citizens, or the representatives in the federal assembly, elect a
federal policymaker. All subsequent results also apply to each of these alternative settings.
17¡Eµ (1 ¡ ®)Ce(xB;e;µ) + [¯Vx(a;xB;µ) + t ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Cx(xB;e;µ)]
dxB
de
= Ãe(e): (17)
Unlike the decentralization regime, an indirect e®ect now shows up in these optimality conditions.
Since larger investments cause region B to set a larger policy level xB, this indirect e®ect is positive
if region A would favor some policy larger than the one chosen by region B, i.e., if transfers are
relatively large. Conversely, it is negative if grants are so small that xB exceeds x¤ (and thus exceeds
the policy preferred by A as well). Given these considerations, regions at the constitutional stage
now face the following tradeo®. Substantial grants which trigger a small policy level xB yield
a small direct investment e®ect and a positive indirect e®ect, and vice versa. Whenever value-
enhancing investments are present, this tradeo® cannot generally be resolved in favor of large
or small grants. In particular, the induced policy can either be larger or smaller than e±cient,
depending on the speci¯c functional forms. We can state the following results.
Proposition 4. Consider centralization without ex-post bargaining. Then, the same optimal output
grant as under decentralization implements an e±cient outcome if the region can undertake only
cost-reducing investments, or if ¯ = 1. Otherwise, an e±cient outcome is infeasible, and the
optimal project choice may be larger or smaller than x¤(¢).
Proof: By our previous arguments, condition (16) cannot hold for a = a¤(e) unless ¯ = 1.
Moreover, xB < x¤ can be second-best optimal because the indirect e®ect becomes positive (xB <
x¤ is always optimal if ¯ · ° so that the direct e®ect is non-positive.)
In summary, neither democratic centralization nor decentralization generate an e±cient outcome
when value-enhancing investments are feasible. Both governance modes yield di®erent economic
outcomes when the second-best e±cient grant schemes are in place. Speci¯cally, their performance
would be identical for grant provisions leading to the e±cient policy outcome xA = xB = x¤.
However, we already know that xA > x¤ is optimal under decentralization while xB larger or
smaller than x¤ prevails in a centralized regime.22 This means that when inter-regional bargaining
is disregarded and central decisionmaking is political rather than benevolent, a clearcut comparison
of regimes is elusive. In the remainder, we ask whether stronger and more intuitive conclusions
emerge in a scenario where politicians are allowed to negotiate ¯nal project sizes with each other,
an issue addressed in the remainder of the paper.
22While the value-enhancing investment is more e±cient under decentralization when xB > x¤ (the indirect
investment e®ect in the centralization regime is then negative), this needs not be the case if xB < x¤ (the indirect
e®ect is positive).
186 Federalism with Political Bargaining
This Section incorporates another element of real-world politics into the model.23 Speci¯cally, we
will allow politicians from di®erent regions to negotiate the ¯nal policy outcome after uncertainty
on bene¯ts and costs has been resolved. Because the policy project is associated with spillovers,
there are bene¯ts from such a policy coordination prior to the ¯nal decision on x. Taking re-
course to Coase (1960), these renegotiations will induce an e±cient outcome provided all parties
have complete information when gathering at the bargaining table. This condition is satis¯ed in
our framework and, therefore, rational politicians will in stage 2 enter negotiations and agree on
the ex-post e±cient policy x¤(a;e;µ). In contrast to the previous literature, we assume political
negotiations to be feasible not only in the centralization regime, but under decentralization as
well.24
For concreteness, we follow the property-rights literature (see, e.g., Hart, 1995) and assume that
the unfolding bargaining process between the regional representatives results in the generalized
Nash-bargaining solution. Thus, in equilibrium each region obtains its governance- and transfer-
dependent disagreement payo®, plus a ¯xed share of the bargaining gain which becomes available
when x(¢) rather than the respective disagreement policy is implemented. The shares re°ect a
region's relative bargaining strength and are parameterized as ° 2 [0;1] for region A and (1 ¡ °)
for region B, respectively.
In what follows, this setting is ¯rst explored for the regime of decentralized governance. Then, we
investigate democratic centralization where decisions again require a majority of delegates in the
federal assembly.
6.1 Decentralized Politics with Bargaining
Under decentralization, region A can autonomously decide on its policy projects. Nevertheless,
there are gains from trade ex post, which can be realized if the region enters negotiations with
the government in B after investments have been expended and the state of the world has become
23This is done in a way which borrows from LÄ ulfesmann (2002) who, however, considers a more restricted model.
His paper does not analyze the case of a benevolent central government, focuses on value-increasing investments,
and disregards output grants.
24As explained in the Introduction, we disregard transaction costs that may render an e±cient outcome infeasible.
Imposing transaction costs would not alter our qualitative results unless they di®er across regimes, which we do not
see as plausible in many situations. After all, we do not see a compelling reason why the possibility to renegotiate
should be linked to the choice of authority structures as ¯xed in the constitution.
19clear. Suppose ¯rst that negotiations with region B fail. Then, region A will in stage 3 again
implement a project of size
xA(a;e;t;®;µ) = arg maxx ¯V (x;¢) + tx ¡ (1 ¡ ®)C(x;¢): (18)
Accordingly, a switch from policy xA(¢) to policy x¤(¢) increases total surplus by an amount ¢DP =
[V (x¤;¢) ¡ C(x¤;¢) ¡ (V (xA;¢) ¡ C(xA;¢))] = S¤(a;e;µ) ¡ S(xA;a;e;µ)) ¸ 0 which represents the
bargaining surplus under decentralized politics (DP). Frictionless negotiations will in equilibrium
be successful and region A appropriates a share ° in Nash bargaining. In stage 1, region A therefore
maximizes
UA
DP(¢) = Eµ [SA(xA;a;e;µ;®;t) + °(S¤(a;e;µ) ¡ S(xA;a;e;µ))] ¡ Á(a) ¡ Ã(e): (DP)
The associated the ¯rst-order conditions for equilibrium investments (aDP;eDP) are25
Eµ
h
(¯ ¡ °)Va(xA;¢) + °Va(x¤;¢) ¡ °[Vx(xA;¢) ¡ Cx(xA;¢)]
dxA(¢)
da
i
= Áa(a) (19)
and
Eµ
h
¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ °)Ce(xA;¢) ¡ °Ce(x¤;¢) ¡ °[Vx(xA;¢) ¡ Cx(xA;¢)]
dxA(¢)
de
i
= Ãe(e) (20)
for (a;e) = (aDP;eDP), respectively. In contrast to our previous scenario in Section 4 where
political bargaining was infeasible, investments now trigger an indirect e®ect under decentralization.
This e®ect emerges because investments a®ect the part of the bargaining surplus ¢DP associated
with region A's default policy xA(¢), and thus A's payo® from bargaining. Remember that larger
investments raise this default policy xA(¢). Now, if the default policy is larger than e±cient,
xA(¢) > x¤, we have Vx(xA) ¡ Cx(xA) < 0 and the indirect e®ect (i.e., the last terms in (19) and
(20)) is positive. Intuitively, since xA is already larger than e±cient, raising it further increases
the bargaining surplus, part of which is reaped by region A.26 Conversely, the indirect e®ect is
negative for xA(¢) < x¤(¢), and it disappears altogether for xA(¢) = x¤(¢).
Suppose that regions agree on an optimal grant system in stage 0. Consider ¯rst the left-hand side
of (19), region A's marginal return from value-increasing investments. For any cost grant ® ¸ 0,
there exists some output grant t which raises xA(¢) above x¤(¢) and renders the indirect e®ect
25We require program (DP) (as well as program (CP), see below) to be well behaved. This is achieved if the
investment cost functions Á(¢) and Ã(¢) are su±ciently convex.
26An increase in xA(¢) and x¤(¢) has only a second-order e®ect on SA(xA;¢) and S(x¤;¢) so that the corresponding
derivatives are zero in (19) and (20).
20positive. At least if ¯ > ° so that the spillover e®ects is not too pronounced and the direct e®ect is
positive, it is then possible to implement a¤(e) by appropriate choice of the constitutional grants
which trigger the optimal default policy xA > x¤.27 For any ®, we can indicate the corresponding
output grant which achieves this outcome as ^ t(®). Notice that any optimal grant design must in
fact have the property that xA > x¤: for a default policy xA which is smaller than e±cient, the
indirect e®ect in (19) would be negative while the direct e®ect is not large enough to generate
proper investment incentives.
Next, consider (20). Note ¯rst that for the same reason as in the scenario without bargaining,
e±cient cost-reducing investment can again be implemented without any Pigouvian cost grant
(® = 0). Fixing the output grant in a way that xA(¢) = x¤(¢), the indirect e®ect disappears and
e±ciency is attained. In contrast to the case analyzed in the previous section, though, the absence
of a cost grant is now by no means necessary to induce an e±cient outcome. To see this, note that
for any choice of ® · 1 ¡ °, the direct e®ect is positive. By adjusting the output grant, it is then
possible to make the direct e®ect arbitrarily large, and the indirect e®ect unambiguously positive.
By continuity, there must exist some ~ t(®) that allows to achieve e¤(a).
We are now prepared to investigate whether e±cient value-increasing and cost-reducing invest-
ments are feasible at the same time. Remember that at least if ¯ ¸ °, e±cient value-enhancing
investments a¤(e) are implementable through constitutional grants (® ¸ 0;^ t(®)). Similarly, any
constitution with (® · 1¡°;~ t(®)) implements e¤(a). Taken together, a ¯rst-best result prevails if
the conditions ¯ ¸ ° and ^ t(®¤) = ~ t(®¤) are satis¯ed for some ®¤ < 1 ¡ °.
Analyzing these conditions yields the following results.
Proposition 5. Consider decentralized governance. In the political bargaining process, inter-
regional renegotiations lead region A to implement the socially optimal policy level x¤(a;e;µ).
Moreover,
(1) Suppose region A can undertake only one type of investment, e or a. For cost-reducing in-
vestments, some set of constitutional policies (®;t) implements an e±cient outcome. This
positive outcome extends to value-enhancing investments (at least) if spillovers are not too
pronounced, ¯ > °.
(2) Suppose region A can undertake both value-enhancing and cost-reducing investments. In this
27We invoke part c) of Assumption 1 here.
21case, the ¯rst best generically prevails for any ¯ > °.
Finally, under the optimal grant design (®¤;t¤), region A's default project size satis¯es xA(¢) >
x¤(¢).
Proof: see the Appendix.
These results say that when political bargaining is taken into account, decentralized authority
yields e±ciency in a wide range of economic situations. Accordingly, the outcome improves upon
the decentralized no-negotiations setting when an optimal grant system is in place.28 E±ciency
again prevails if the region can undertake only cost-reducing investments. In sharp contrast to
the earlier scenario without political bargaining, however, a ¯rst best outcome is also achieved
in situations where the region undertakes value-enhancing investments, and generically so if the
project region's own bene¯t from the public project are su±ciently large (i.e., ¯ > °).29 And
even better, the same desirable outcome ca be achieved in the general setting with cost-reducing
and bene¯t-enhancing investments. In all these situations, subsidiarity reaches the Pareto frontier,
with the help of a grant system which pushes A's preferred default project xA above x¤.
There is a strong economic intuition behind these ¯ndings. In a scenario where political bargaining
is not allowed for, grants not only have to provide investment incentives for region A, but also to
ensure an optimal policy choice. As we have seen in the last Section, these goals are generally
incompatible. Now, with political negotiations, an e±cient policy choice is achieved irrespective of
the grant design, and the exclusive purpose of grants is in enhancing investments. A proper grant
design must take into account that negotiations add an indirect investment e®ect to the project
region's payo®. This indirect e®ect arises because a change in the default policy size reduces (as
long as xA < x¤) or increases (for xA > x¤) the bargaining surplus which is shared between both
regions. The indirect e®ect is thus positive if xA exceeds x¤, that is, if the grant promise to region
A is su±ciently generous. Since at the same time the direct investment e®ect is increasing in xA
without bounds if ¯ > °, i.e., larger grants unambiguously push investment incentives upward,
thereby implementing the ¯rst best.
28Without a grant system in place (® = t = 0), there is xA(¢) < x¤(¢) whenever ¯ < 1. In this case, a perhaps
surprising conclusion emerges. A system where e±ciency-improving political bargaining is allowed can overall be
worse than a setting where regions do not negotiate with each other. In other words, a commitment not to bargain
can be a useful commitment device if the constitutional grant design is ine±cient.
29For example, suppose a region's bargaining strength is a function of its population size only. For regions of
equal size so that ° = 1=2, the ¯rst best is then attained when the project generates a larger bene¯t in A than in B.
22If spillovers are strong, i.e., ¯ · °, the direct e®ect is negative and even when xA(¢) > x¤(¢), the
direct and the indirect e®ect in (19) have opposite signs. This renders a general e±ciency result in-
feasible in cases where spillovers are very pronounced. In some situations, though, decentralization
achieves the ¯rst best no matter what the degree of spillovers, i.e., for any arbitrary combination
of (¯;°). This is demonstrated in two examples below, which are fully analyzed in the Appendix.
Example 1: Let V (¢) = aln(1 + x) and C(¢) = maxf(z ¡ e)x;0g, z > 0. For (a;e) = (a¤;e¤),
condition (19) can be written as
(¯ ¡ °)ln(1 + xA(¢)) + °[
1 + xA(¢)
1 + xFB ¡ 1] = (1 ¡ °)ln(1 + xFB):
The left-hand side of this condition increases in xA without bounds. Since the value of the right-
hand side is bounded from above, some constitutional grant policy (®;t) implements a default
policy xA(> x¤) that satis¯es (19) for all parameter combinations (¯;°), implementing e±cient
value-increasing investments. (In the Appendix, we show that e±cient cost-reducing investments
can be achieved at the same time.)
Example 2: Let V (¢) = ax + y ln(1 + x) and C(¢) = x2=2 ¡ ex, with y ¸ 0. The ¯rst-order
condition (19) reads for (a;e) = (a¤;e¤) and inserting ® = 1 ¡ ¯ as a necessary condition for
e±cient value-increasing and cost-reducing investments (see the proof of Proposition 6),
(¯ ¡ °)xA ¡ °[(x¤ ¡ xA) ¡ (
y
1 + x¤ ¡
y
1 + xA)]
(1 + xA)2
y + (1 + xA)2 = (1 ¡ °)x¤:
In the Appendix, we show that for any y, the Left-hand side of this condition is increasing in xA
without bounds, implying that a ¯rst best outcome prevails for any (y;¯;°).
6.2 Centralized Politics
Under centralized governance, the policy outcome is determined in a federal parliament by majority
rule. While a majority faction in the assembly is then legally entitled to implement its preferred
policy in principle, renegotiations with the minority are welfare improving and will lead to an
outcome which re°ects the mutual interest of all regions.30 Suppose again that delegates from
30Under the unanimity rule, region A will strictly underinvest in cost-reducing as well as in value-enhancing
activities whenever ° < 1, and the initial grant policy is irrelevant. To see this, notice that delegates from either
region can veto the implementation of any new policy. Since one region will always have an interest to do so in
anticipation of subsequent bargaining, the default allocation is x = 0 where region A receives no grant payments.
Accordingly, both regions share the bargaining surplus S(x¤;a;e;µ) in negotiations from which A reaps a fraction
°. The ¯rst-order conditions then read °EµSa(x¤;a;µ) = Áa(a) and °EµSe(x¤;e;µ) = Ãe(e), respectively, so that
underinvestment is unavoidable unless region A has all the bargaining power, ° = 1.
23the composite region B form the majority, and that political bargaining is successful. In the
out-of-equilibrium event that stage-2 renegotiations fail, region B will in stage 3 implement
xB(a;e;µ) = arg maxx (1 ¡ ¯)V (x;a;µ) ¡ tx ¡ ®C(x;e;µ): (21)
Unlike decentralization, the default policy (here xB) is now increasing in the size of the externality
¯, and decreasing in both the output grant parameter t and the cost grant parameter ®. Antic-
ipating this default policy, as well as the outcome of stage-2 negotiations, region A maximizes in
stage 1 (CP stands for centralized politics)
UA
CP(¢) = Eµ [SA(xB;a;e;µ;®;t) + °(S¤(a;e;µ) ¡ S(xB;a;e;µ))] ¡ Á(a) ¡ Ã(e) (CP);
and, using the envelope theorem, the ¯rst-order conditions for equilibrium investments (aCP;eCP)
read31
Eµ
h
(¯ ¡ °)Va(xB;¢) + °Va(x¤;¢) + (1 ¡ °)[Vx(xB;¢) ¡ Cx(xB;¢)]
dxB(¢)
da
i
= Áa(a) (22)
and
Eµ
h
¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ °)Ce(xB;¢) ¡ °Ce(x¤;¢) + (1 ¡ °)[Vx(xB;¢) ¡ Cx(xB;¢)]
dxB(¢)
de
i
= Ãe(e) (23)
for (a;e) = (aCP;eCP). A comparison with the corresponding conditions for the decentralization
regime immediately yields a preliminary but interesting result:
Proposition 6. Consider a Pigouvian grant system (®;t) that implements xA(¢) = xB(¢) = x¤(¢).
Under any such system, investment outcomes under centralization and decentralization coincide.
Pigouvian grants trigger an ex-post e±cient outcome in each regime, which causes the indirect
e®ects to vanish.32 At the same time, they make the default payo®s under decentralization and
centralization identical. Hence, investment incentives coincide.33
To continue with the analysis of (22) and (23), note that in comparison to decentralized governance,
the sign of the indirect e®ect is now reversed for a given default policy x. In sharp contrast to
31Note that SA
x (xB;¢) = Sx(xB;¢) since SB
x (xB;¢) = 0.
32There exists a continuum of Pigouvian grant systems in the present setting, most obviously, the cost grant
® = 1 ¡ ¯. More generally, each combination (®;t) that satis¯es t(®) = (1 ¡ ®)Cx(x¤(¢);¢) ¡ ¯Vx(x¤(¢)) evaluated
at the investment levels which emerge endogenously for given grant parameters implements xA(¢) = xB(¢) = x¤(¢).
33This equivalence result highlights the di®erence to the setting analyzed in Besley and Ghatak (2001): even for
identical default project sizes, investment incentives in their framework di®er across regimes because the marginal
investment return ceteris paribus depends on the governance structure by assumption.
24decentralization, region A has an incentive to in°uence the default policy not only in order to
a®ect the bargaining surplus (a motive present under decentralization as well), but also in order to
raise its own default payo® SA(xB;¢). To see this, note that region B selects a large default policy
xB if and only if A's eligible grants are small, whereas region A's interests are the exact opposite.
Region A will thus invest more in order to raise xB and to increase its default payo® if grants are
sizable, and vice versa. This default payo® e®ect dominates the countervailing bargaining surplus
e®ect, implying that - in contrast to decentralized governance - the overall indirect e®ect is negative
whenever xB > x¤. Analyzing (22) and (23), we obtain
Proposition 7. Consider centralized governance with majority rule, and suppose that delegates
from region B form the majority. Then,
(1) if region A undertakes only cost-reducing investments, there always exists a transfer scheme
(®¤ = 0;t¤ > 0) which achieves the ¯rst-best outcome.
(2) If region A undertakes value-increasing activities or both types of investments, a ¯rst-best
outcome is not generally achieved even if ¯ > °.
Proof: The Appendix demonstrates ine±cient outcomes for our previous Examples 1 and 2.
In conjunction with our previous ¯ndings, these results are the central part of our analysis. Even
if an optimally chosen grant system is in place, centralized authority performs worse than decen-
tralized governance. There is also an intuitive explanation for this possibly surprising outcome.
Under centralization, the incentive of region A to invest into the value of subsequent policies is
no longer aligned with its interest to induce a large default policy. Since the default policy xB is
chosen by the composite region B under centralization, it will exceed the e±cient level x¤(¢) only
if (grants are small and) region A bears much of the project's implementation costs. Under these
circumstances, however, region A has preferences for a small xB which it can achieve by reducing
its own investments. This logic often makes an e±cient outcome impossible even if spillovers are
not very pronounced. In particular, reconsider the previous examples in which decentralization
established e±ciency. For Example 2 with V (¢) = ax + y ln(1 + x), centralization renders e±-
cient value-increasing investments infeasible if y is either su±ciently low, or su±ciently large. In
Example 1 where V (¢) = aln(1 + x), ine±ciencies even prevail for all conceivable combinations
(¯ < 1;°).
257 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question whether the e®ectiveness of a federal system depends on its
governance structure, even if an optimally designed grant system is in place. According to the key
¯nding emerging from our analysis, centralized and decentralized federal systems do not exhibit the
same incentives when a project region is responsible for stages in the production process of public
projects. This ¯nding is in tension with a central tenet of the standard literature on federalism,
namely that an appropriately chosen (Pigouvian) grant would make the economic outcome in
each regime indistinguishable. As we show, the scope of this argument does not extend to our
framework which incorporates a moral hazard component of government activities. In this setting,
the governance structure is shown to shape the attainable outcome even under an optimal grant
design.
There are also more speci¯c results which are borne out in our analysis. As long as the central
government is benevolent, centralization is preferable to decentralization and a ¯rst best outcome
can be implemented. To achieve this outcome, positive cost-matching grants as well as output
grants are to be paid to the investing region. Moving away from this ideal setting, we then analyze
a framework where centralized policies are chosen in a partisan political process in which regional
representatives pursue their own interests. If political negotiations are disregarded, neither cen-
tralization nor decentralization then reach the e±ciency frontier, irrespective of the grant system
in place. Both governance regimes su®er from the fact that grants are supposed to simultaneously
implement an ex-post e±cient policy outcome, and to provide optimal e±cient investment incen-
tives. While we found that these tasks cannot be accomplished at the same time, no economically
intuitive characterization of the second-best optimal governance can be provided.
This changes when the possibility of political negotiations between regional politicians is taken into
account. Perhaps the most striking conclusion of our analysis is that constitutional grant policies
are systematically less e®ective in a centralized system when political bargaining is admitted. Under
decentralization, grants and investment incentives are aligned. Large grants to the investing region
trigger higher investments because they lead this region to substantially invest into its default
policy, and to raise this default policy at the same time. In our political economy interpretation
of centralized governance, majority regions can force a minority region to carry out public policies
at a scale preferred by the majority. When the constitution requires the minority to bear a
disproportionate share of the associated costs, this region has an incentive to invest less in order to
26make a large project less attractive for the ruling majority. Alternatively, when the minority region
is eligible for large grants under the constitution (implying the majority bears most of the project
costs), the majority regions will implement only a small-scale project and investment incentives
for the investing region are again relatively low. Unlike decentralized governance, grants are thus
negatively correlated with default policy levels, and they can in general not be adjusted in a way
as to generate e±cient investment incentives. Our analysis identi¯es this feature as an inherent
problem of centralized governance.
Since political negotiations are a tool to realize some mutual gain, we found it crucial to incorporate
them into an analysis of federal structures. Communication among decisionmakers happens on a
constant basis in real-world politics, and the outcome of political negotiations is often enforceable
to a large degree. While our results suggest that the possibility to bargain improves the relative
performance of decentralized over centralized governance, our simple model is only a ¯rst step and
future research should investigate the robustness of this result in more general frameworks.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove part (1), consider cost-reducing investments. By inspection of (17), ® = 0 in combination
with some non-negative t so that xA(¢) = x¤(¢) implements an e±cient outcome. To prove part (2),
consider value-increasing investments. For ¯ = 1 and ® = t = 0, we have xA(¢) = x¤(¢) and (16)
as well as (17) coincide with the conditions for e±cient investments, so that a ¯rst-best outcome
is attained. Conversely, for ¯ < 1, region A chooses a < a¤(e) even if (t;®) are chosen such that
xA(¢) = x¤(¢). Accordingly, e±cient investments are incompatible with an ex-post e±cient policy
choice (allocative e±ciency) if the region undertakes value-increasing investments. Next, observe
that increasing xA(¢) marginally above x¤(¢) has only a second-order e®ect on allocative e±ciency
and on e while the associated increase in a induces a positive ¯rst order e®ect. As a consequence,
the second-best optimal policy must entail xA(¢) > x¤(¢). Finally, if the region expends both value-
increasing and cost-reducing investments, it cannot be optimal to distort e away from the level
that is optimal conditional on xA(¢). Hence, the second-best constitutional policy is characterized
by ®¤ = 0, t¤ > 0 and xA(¢) > x¤(¢). 2
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the second part, note that since xA = x¤ for the proposed Pigouvian grant structure,
the indirect e®ect in (6) disappears and the ¯rst-order conditions (11) and (6) coincide. We now
prove the ¯rst part, and consider a situation without grants. Comparing (6) and (11) shows
that for any given policy level x < x¤, investments under decentralization strictly exceed those
under centralization for any ¯ < 1. At the same time, the policy level xA which prevails under
decentralization is strictly smaller than e±cient which yields a countervailing e®ect with respect to
overall e±ciency. To show that decentralization can yield a larger social surplus W = V ¡C¡Á¡Ã,
consider now the following example: Let V = ax, C = x2=2, and Á(a) = a3=3. Then, x¤(a) = a,
a¤ = 1, and xA = ¯a (for ® = t = 0). Region A's equilibrium investments then are aD = ¯2 under
decentralization, and they are aC = maxf0;2¯ ¡1g under a benevolent central government [insert
in (6) to obtain the ¯rst-order condition ¯a+[¯a¡a] = a2]. Accordingly, equilibrium policies are
x(aC) = maxf0;2¯ ¡ 1g under centralization, and x(aD) = ¯3 under decentralization. Inserting,
total surplus in the centralization regime is WC = 0 for ¯ · 1=2, which implies that WC < WD.
28For ¯ > 1=2, aC · aD and x(aC) · x(aD) with strict inequality for any ¯ < 1, so that again
WC < WD 8¯ < 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove part (1), consider ¯rst a situation where region A can undertake only cost-reducing
investments. De¯ne ~ t(®) as an output grant that implements e¤(a) for given a and given ®. For
® = 0, e = e¤(a) requires the indirect e®ect to disappear, i.e., xA(¢) = x¤(¢). Since xA(¢) is
monotonically increasing in t without bounds and xA(¢) < x¤(¢) for t = 0 and ¯ < 1, there exists
some ~ t(0) > 0 which implements e = e¤(a). For any ® < 1 ¡ °, the direct e®ect is positive.
Moreover, the output grant t makes it possible to let xA become arbitrarily large. Since the
indirect e®ect is positive for any xA > x¤ and the direct e®ect becomes arbitrarily large as xA ! ¹ x
(refer Assumption 1e), ~ t(®) > 0 exists for any ® < 1 ¡ °. Continuity then ensures that ~ t(®) also
exists for any intermediate ® 2 [0;1 ¡ °).34
Next, consider value-increasing investments. Consider an arbitrary ¯ ¸ ° and let ^ t(®) be an output
grant that implements a = a¤(e) for given e and given ®.35 For any ¯ < 1, implementing a¤(e)
requires the indirect e®ect to be positive, which in turn demands that the optimal grant design
must ensure xA > x¤. Note that the indirect e®ect is positive for any xA > x¤ and converges to
zero as xA ! x¤. Also, the direct e®ect becomes arbitrarily large as xA ! ¹ x (by Assumption 1e).
By continuity, these arguments imply that ^ t(®) exists for any ® 2 [0;1].
To prove part (2), verify that the ¯rst best can be implemented if and only if there exists some
® with the property ~ t(®) = ^ t(®). We show that this condition is indeed satis¯ed for some ® if
¯ > °. To do so, we ¯rst establish that ^ t(®) > ~ t(®) > 0 for ® = 0. Recall that (20) is satis¯ed
for ® = 0 if and only if xA(¢) = xFB(¢), i.e., the indirect e®ect is zero. This requires some positive
output grant ~ t(0) > 0 for ¯ < 1. Conversely, to satisfy (19) for a = a¤(e) under a cost-grant
policy ® = 0, it is necessary to have a strictly positive indirect e®ect whenever ¯ < 1. Accordingly,
some default policy xA(¢) > x¤(¢) must be implemented. Indicate this policy as xA
A. Since xA(¢)
is increasing in t, ^ t(0) > ~ t(0) is immediate. Next, note that ^ t(®) is strictly decreasing in ®: since
xA(¢;®;t) is increasing in t and in ®, xA = xA
A requires ^ t(¢) to be decreasing. Fix xA at the level
xA
A, and consider (20). As ® increases, the ¯rst term in this condition (the direct e®ect) decreases.
34The optimal output grant ~ t(¢) needs not to be monotonic in ®. Note also that for ® ¸ 1 ¡ °, ~ t(®) does not
necessarily exist: any output grant that raises xA(¢) and thus boosts the indirect e®ect increases the negative direct
at the same time. See, however, our arguments below.
35For ¯ < °, the direct e®ect is negative and a raise in xA(¢) triggers countervailing incentives. Accordingly, the
¯rst best cannot generally be ensured.
29Speci¯cally, it becomes negative and decreases without bounds for cost grants ® > 1 ¡ °. Fix t at
the level ^ t(®) which leaves the indirect e®ect constant. Then, the size of the LHS of (20) decreases
in ® without bounds. Accordingly, there must exist some ®¤ > 0 such that ^ t(®¤) = ~ t(®¤), and a
¯rst-best outcome (aFB;eFB) is attained. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
To prove that e±cient cost-reducing investments e¤ can generically be implemented, notice that a
constitutional design with ® = 1¡¯ and t = 0 implies xB = x¤, and satis¯es (23). Next, we show
that a¤ cannot generally be implemented for ¯ ¸ °. To see this, consider the class of functional
forms V (x;a;µ) = g(x;µ) + f(a;µ)x and C(x;e;µ) = h(x;µ) ¡ k(e;µ)x. De¯ne
z(x;¢) ´ ¡
Vx(x;¢) ¡ Cx(x;¢)
(1 ¡ ¯)Vxx(x;¢) ¡ ®Cxx(x;¢)
1 ¡ ¯
®
;
and recall that Áa(a¤) = EµVa(xFB;a¤;µ) and Ãe(e¤) = ¡EµCe(xFB;e¤;µ). Using these properties,
(22) holds for (a;e) = (a¤;e¤) i®
fa(a¤)[Eµ[(1 ¡ °)xFB(¢) ¡ (¯ ¡ °)xB(¢) ¡ (1 ¡ °)z(xFB;¢)] = 0 (24)
ke(e¤)[Eµ[(1 ¡ °)xFB(¢) ¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ °)xB(¢) ¡ (1 ¡ °)z(xFB;¢)] = 0: (25)
By inspection, (a¤;e¤) can be implemented only if ® = 1 ¡ ¯ (also note that for this cost grant,
(24) and (25) are identical) . For t = 0 so that xB = x¤, the left-hand side of both conditions is
positive. Increasing t above zero lowers xB below x¤ which causes two e®ects. First, the (positive)
sum of the ¯rst two terms in (24) and (25) goes up as xB decreases. On the other hand, though,
the third terms in these conditions becomes unambiguously negative. These countervailing e®ects
(which are also present for t < 0) show that e±cient investments cannot generally be implemented.
(Example 2 below is an example for the class of functional forms analyzed here).
Example 1
Let V (¢) = aln(1+x) and C(¢) = maxfx(z ¡e);0g where z is some positive constant. Suppose all
optimization programs are well behaved, which is always the case for su±ciently convex investment
cost functions. Considering interior solutions, we then have x¤ = a=(z ¡ e) ¡ 1, xA = ¯a=[(1 ¡
®)(z ¡ e) ¡ t] ¡ 1, and xB = (1 ¡ ¯)a=[®(z ¡ e) + t] ¡ 1.
We ¯rst analyze decentralization. In this regime, the optimality condition (19) reads for (a;e) =
30(a¤;e¤) and using Áa(¢) = Va(x¤;¢) and dx
A
da = (1 + xA)=a,
(¯ ¡ °)ln(1 + xA) ¡ °[
a¤
1 + xA ¡ (z ¡ e)]
1 + xA
a¤ = (1 ¡ °)ln(1 + x¤):
Since that z ¡ e = a¤=(x¤ + 1), this condition can be rewritten as
(¯ ¡ °)ln(1 + xA) + °[
1 + xA
1 + x¤ ¡ 1] = (1 ¡ °)ln(1 + x¤) (DP ¤)
Observe that for any xA · x¤, (DP ¤) cannot hold because (for ¯ < 1) the left-hand side is smaller
than the right-hand side. Consider ¯rst ¯ ¸ °. Then, increasing xA above x¤ raises the left-hand
side without bounds. Accordingly, there exists some ^ x¤
A - and some grant policy (®;t) implementing
^ x¤
A - that generates e±cient value-increasing investments. Next, consider ¯ < °. Note that the
derivative of the left-hand side with respect to xA, (¯ ¡ °)=(1 + xA) + °=(1 + x¤), is positive and
increasing without bounds for any xA > x¤ and any (¯;°). Accordingly, there again exists some
default policy level x¤
A > x¤ and some constitutional grant policy which implements the optimum.
We now show that e±cient cost-reducing investments are feasible at the same time. To see this,
note ¯rst that condition (DP ¤) does not directly depend on ® (but only indirectly via xA). Now,
using Ãe(e¤) = ¡Ce(x¤;¢), rewrite (20) as
(1 ¡ ® ¡ °)xA ¡ °[Vx(xA;¢) ¡ Cx(xA;¢)]
dxA
de
= (1 ¡ °)x¤:
Fix xA(> x¤) at the level required to satisfy (DP ¤). Verify that the second term in the above
condition is then positive, and overinvestments prevail for ® = 0. Increasing ® - while lowering
t in a way as to leave xA constant - decreases the LHS of the condition without bounds, which
immediately yields the result.
Consider now the Centralization regime. Replicating our previous steps and noting that dxB=da =
(1 + xB)=a , the condition for e±cient value-increasing investments now reads
(¯ ¡ °)ln(1 + xB) + (1 ¡ °)[1 ¡
1 + xB
1 + x¤ ] = (1 ¡ °)ln(1 + x¤):
Consider ¯rst ¯ ¸ °. Again, underinvestments prevail for xB = x¤. Taking the derivative of the
left-hand side with respect to xB shows that its maximizer is ^ xB ´ (1 + x¤)(¯ ¡ °)=(1 ¡ °) ¡ 1
if x¤ + 1 ¸ (1 ¡ °)=(¯ ¡ °) (i.e., at an interior solution), and ^ xB = 0 otherwise. If ^ xB = 0, the
above condition becomes 1¡1=(1+x¤) = ln(1+x¤). It is then immediate that the left-hand side
is smaller than the right-hand side for any x¤ > 0, and underinvestments prevail. Next, let ^ xB be
positive. After inserting and manipulating, the above condition becomes
(¯ ¡ °)ln
¯ ¡ °
1 ¡ °
+ (1 ¡ ¯) = (1 ¡ ¯)ln(1 + x¤):
31By construction, underinvestments prevail if the left-hand side (LHS) of this condition is smaller
than its right-hand side (RHS). To show this, de¯ne a function Z = LHS ¡ RHS and take the
derivative with respect to ¯. Doing so yields dZ=d¯ = ln(¯ ¡ °)=(1 ¡ °) + ln(1 + x¤). Recalling
that we require x¤ ¸ (1¡°)=(¯¡°)¡1, this derivative is identical zero for x¤ = (1¡°)=(¯¡°)¡1,
and strictly positive for any larger x¤. As a consequence, the function Z is maximized at ¯ = 1.
But for this level of the externality parameter, Z = 0 and, as a consequence, underinvestments
cannot be avoided for any ¯ < 1 (Note that for ¯ = 1, xB = x¤ achieves e±ciency, but region
B's incentive to choose a positive default payo® is then exclusively driven by negative transfers).
Finally, for ¯ < °, the left-hand side of the above condition is again maximized at xB = 0, and
by our previous arguments underinvestments prevail. Taken together, regardless of the size of x¤,
there exists no constitutional grant policy (i.e., no xB) which implements an e±cient outcome,
irrespective of the parameter combinations (¯ < 1;°).
Example 2
Let V (¢) = ax+y ln(1+x) and C(¢) = x2=2¡ex;0, where y is a non-negative constant. Suppose
again that the investment cost functions are su±ciently convex t make the program well behaved.
For given investments, the optimal policy size is implicitly de¯ned by the ¯rst-order condition
a + e + y=(1 + x¤) ¡ x¤ = 0.
Consider decentralization ¯rst. In this regime, the optimality condition (19) reads for (a;e) =
(a¤;e¤) and using Áa(¢) = Va(x¤;¢),
(¯ ¡ °)xA(¢) ¡ °[Vx(xA(¢)) ¡ Cx(xA(¢)]
dxA(¢)
da
= (1 ¡ °)x¤(¢):
Region A's default policy xA(¢) is de¯ned by the solution to ¯[a+y=(1+xA)]¡(1¡®)[xA¡e]+t = 0.
One thus obtains
dxA
da
= ¡
¯
¡¯y=(1 + xA)2 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
=
(1 + xA)2
y + 1¡®
¯ (1 + xA)2 > 0:
Using ® = 1¡¯ as a necessary condition for e±cient value-increasing and cost-reducing investments
for the present class of functional forms (see the proof of Proposition 6), the above optimality
condition becomes,
(¯ ¡ °)xA ¡ °[(x¤ ¡ xA) ¡ (
y
1 + x¤ ¡
y
1 + xA)]
(1 + xA)2
y + (1 + xA)2 = (1 ¡ °)x¤ (DP ¤):
When ¯ < 1, underinvestments prevails for any xA · x¤ (the left-hand side LHS of condition
(DP ¤) is smaller than the ¯nite value of the right-hand side). Also, for ¯ ¸ °, the LHS is
32increasing in xA without bounds. Accordingly, by the intermediate value theorem, there must
exist some constitutional policy (® = 1 ¡ ¯;t > 0) and some associated xA(¢) which implements
(e¤;a¤). To see that this ¯rst-best result extends to the case ¯ < °, take the derivative of the LHS,
dLHS
dxA = (¯ ¡ °) + °
dxA
da
[1 ¡
y
(1 + xA)2] ¡ °[Vx ¡ Cx]
d[dxA=da]
dxA :
Since
d[dx
A=da]
dxA > 0, the third term in this condition is increasing for any xA > x¤. Also, the
expression in brackets in the second term converges to unity for xA su±ciently big, and so does
dxA=da. For xA chosen su±ciently large, the second term thus converges to a size of °, implying
that dLHS=dxA > ¯ ¸ 0. Hence, by appropriate choice of (® = 1 ¡ ¯;t > 0) the LHS increases
without bounds, and e±cient value-increasing investments prevail. Finally, notice that e±cient
cost-reducing investments are achieved at the same time because ® = 1 ¡ ¯.
Next, we analyze the Centralization regime. The relevant optimality condition (22) reads
(¯ ¡ °)xB(¢) + (1 ¡ °)[Vx(xB(¢)) ¡ Cx(xB(¢)]
dxB(¢)
da
= (1 ¡ °)x¤(¢):
Since region B's default policy xB(¢) is implicitly given by (1¡¯)[a+y=(1+xB)]¡®[xB¡e]¡t = 0,
one obtains
dxB
da
= ¡
1 ¡ ¯
¡(1 ¡ ¯)y=(1 + xB)2 ¡ ®
=
(1 + xB)2
y + ®
1¡¯(1 + xB)2 > 0:
Inserting into the optimality condition yields (CP ¤),
(¯ ¡ °)xB + (1 ¡ °)[(x¤ ¡ xB) ¡ (
y
1 + x¤ ¡
y
1 + xB )]
(1 + xB)2
y + ®
1¡¯(1 + xB)2 = (1 ¡ °)x¤:
We analyze this condition in what follows.
1) Consider y = 0 so that the value function is linear. Check that the value of the Left-hand
side of (CP¤) is maximized at xB = 0. Then, notice that the optimality condition holds for
® = 1¡¯ and xB = 0 so that e±cient value-increasing investments are feasible. In addition,
by our previous results, e±cient cost reducing investments are achieved.
2) Consider now y > 0. First, let ® = 1¡¯, the necessary condition for simultaneous investment
e±ciency. Notice that for this combination, dxB=da < 1 for any y;xB. We ¯rst show that
underinvestment is unavoidable if y is small. To see this, take the derivative of the Left-hand
side with respect to xB, which yields
dLHS
dxB = (¯ ¡ °) ¡ (1 ¡ °)
dxB
da
[1 +
y
(1 + xB)2] + (1 ¡ °)[Vx ¡ Cx]
d[dxB=da]
dxB :
33For for y ! 0, dxB=da converges to one and accordingly, the second term converges to
¡(1 ¡ °). Also, since
d[dx
B=da]
dxB = 2y(1 ¡ °)(Vx ¡ Cx), the third term converges to zero as
y ! 0. Taken together, LHS is maximized at xB = 0 if y is su±ciently small. Substituting
xB = 0 into (CP ¤), this condition turns into
(1 ¡ °)[x¤ ¡
y
1 + x¤ + y]
1
1 + y
= (1 ¡ °)x¤:
Simple algebra shows that this condition cannot hold whenever y > 0. This proves that
e±cient cost-reducing and value-increasing investments cannot simultaneously be achieved if
xB = 0 is the maximizer of the LHS of (CP ¤), which occurs (at least) if y > 0 is su±ciently
small. (Remark: According to results in the next paragraph, simultaneous e±ciency is also
unattainable for y being su±ciently large).
Finally, we show that allowing for ® 6= 1 ¡ ¯ (such that e±cient cost and value investments
are incompatible) is no remedy to generate value-increasing investments if if y is su±ciently
large, and if ¯ · °. To validate this claim, note that the LHS of (CP¤) is maximized for
® = 0 so that dxB=da = (1 + xB)2=y. To show that it is impossible to satisfy (CP ¤), note
that the second term of LHS converges to zero for any xB as y becomes large. Since the ¯rst
term in LHS is non-positive, the result follows. 2
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